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Abstract. The Student-Project Allocation problem with preferences
over Projects (SPA-P) involves sets of students, projects and lecturers,
where the students and lecturers each have preferences over the projects.
In this context, we typically seek a stable matching of students to projects
(and lecturers). However, these stable matchings can have different sizes,
and the problem of finding a maximum stable matching (MAX-SPA-P) is
NP-hard. There are two known approximation algorithms for MAX-SPA-
P, with performance guarantees of 2 and 3
2
. In this paper, we describe
an Integer Programming (IP) model to enable MAX-SPA-P to be solved
optimally. Following this, we present results arising from an empirical
analysis that investigates how the solution produced by the approxi-
mation algorithms compares to the optimal solution obtained from the
IP model, with respect to the size of the stable matchings constructed,
on instances that are both randomly-generated and derived from real
datasets. Our main finding is that the 3
2
-approximation algorithm finds
stable matchings that are very close to having maximum cardinality.
Keywords: Integer Programming model · Student-Project Allocation
problem · Blocking pair · Stable matching · Maximum cardinality match-
ing · Empirical analysis
1 Introduction
Matching problems, which generally involve the assignment of a set of agents
to another set of agents based on preferences, have wide applications in many
real-world settings. One such application can be seen in an educational context,
e.g., the allocation of pupils to schools, school-leavers to universities and stu-
dents to projects. In the context of allocating students to projects, university
lecturers propose a range of projects, and each student is required to provide a
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2preference over the available projects that she finds acceptable. Lecturers may
also have preferences over the students that find their project acceptable and/or
the projects that they offer. There may also be upper bounds on the number of
students that can be assigned to a particular project, and the number of stu-
dents that a given lecturer is willing to supervise. The problem then is to allocate
students to projects based on these preferences and capacity constraints – the
so-called Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA) [11,3].
Two major models of SPA exist in the literature: one permits preferences
only from the students [2,6,10], while the other permits preferences from the
students and lecturers [1,8]. Given the large number of students that are typically
involved in such an allocation process, many university departments seek to
automate the allocation of students to projects. Examples include the School of
Computing Science, University of Glasgow [10], the Faculty of Science, University
of Southern Denmark [4], the Department of Computing Science, University of
York [8], and elsewhere [2,3,6].
In general, we seek a matching, which is a set of agent pairs who find one
another acceptable that satisfies the capacities of the agents involved. For match-
ing problems where preferences exist from the two sets of agents involved (e.g.,
junior doctors and hospitals in the classical Hospitals-Residents problem (HR)
[5], or students and lecturers in the context of SPA), it has been argued that the
desired property for a matching one should seek is that of stability [13]. Infor-
mally, a stable matching ensures that no acceptable pair of agents who are not
matched together would rather be assigned to each other than remain with their
current assignees.
Abraham, Irving and Manlove [1] proposed two linear-time algorithms to
find a stable matching in a variant of SPA where students have preferences over
projects, whilst lecturers have preferences over students. The stable matching
produced by the first algorithm is student-optimal (that is, students have the
best possible projects that they could obtain in any stable matching) while the
one produced by the second algorithm is lecturer-optimal (that is, lecturers have
the best possible students that they could obtain in any stable matching).
Manlove and O’Malley [12] proposed another variant of SPA where both stu-
dents and lecturers have preferences over projects, referred to as SPA-P. In their
paper, they formulated an appropriate stability definition for SPA-P, and they
showed that stable matchings in this context can have different sizes. More-
over, in addition to stability, a very important requirement in practice is to
match as many students to projects as possible. Consequently, Manlove and
O’Malley [12] proved that the problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable
matching, denoted MAX-SPA-P, is NP-hard. Further, they gave a polynomial-time
2-approximation algorithm for MAX-SPA-P. Subsequently, Iwama, Miyazaki and
Yanagisawa [7] described an improved approximation algorithm with an upper
bound of 3
2
, which builds on the one described in [12]. In addition, Iwama et
al. [7] showed that MAX-SPA-P is not approximable within 21
19
− ǫ, for any ǫ > 0,
unless P = NP. For the upper bound, they modified Manlove and O’Malley’s
3algorithm [12] using Kira´ly’s idea [9] for the approximation algorithm to find a
maximum stable matching in a variant of the Stable Marriage problem.
Considering the fact that the existing algorithms for MAX-SPA-P are only
guaranteed to produce an approximate solution, we seek another technique to
enable MAX-SPA-P to be solved optimally. Integer Programming (IP) is a powerful
technique for producing optimal solutions to a range of NP-hard optimisation
problems, with the aid of commercial optimisation solvers, e.g., Gurobi [14],
GLPK [15] and CPLEX [16]. These solvers can allow IP models to be solved in
a reasonable amount of time, even with respect to problem instances that occur
in practical applications.
Our Contribution. In Sect. 3, we describe an IP model to enable MAX-SPA-P to
be solved optimally, and present a correctness result. In Sect. 4, we present results
arising from an empirical analysis that investigates how the solution produced by
the approximation algorithms compares to the optimal solution obtained from
our IP model, with respect to the size of the stable matchings constructed, on in-
stances that are both randomly-generated and derived from real datasets. These
real datasets are based on actual student preference data and manufactured lec-
turer preference data from previous runs of student-project allocation processes
at the School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow. We also present
results showing the time taken by the IP model to solve the problem instances
optimally. Our main finding is that the 3
2
-approximation algorithm finds stable
matchings that are very close to having maximum cardinality. The next section
gives a formal definition for SPA-P.
2 Definitions and Preliminaries
We give a formal definition for SPA-P as described in the literature [12]. An
instance I of SPA-P involves a set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn1} of students, a set P =
{p1, p2, . . . , pn2} of projects and a set L = {l1, l2, . . . , ln3} of lecturers. Each
lecturer lk ∈ L offers a non-empty subset of projects, denoted by Pk. We assume
that P1, P2, . . . , Pn3 partitions P (that is, each project is offered by one lecturer).
Also, each student si ∈ S has an acceptable set of projects Ai ⊆ P . We call a pair
(si, pj) ∈ S×P an acceptable pair if pj ∈ Ai. Moreover si ranks Ai in strict order
of preference. Similarly, each lecturer lk ranks Pk in strict order of preference.
Finally, each project pj ∈ P and lecturer lk ∈ L has a positive capacity denoted
by cj and dk respectively.
An assignment M is a subset of S × P where (si, pj) ∈ M implies that si
finds pj acceptable (that is, pj ∈ Ai). We define the size of M as the number
of (student, project) pairs in M , denoted |M |. If (si, pj) ∈ M , we say that si is
assigned to pj and pj is assigned si. Furthermore, we denote the project assigned
to student si in M as M(si) (if si is unassigned in M then M(si) is undefined).
Similarly, we denote the set of students assigned to project pj in M as M(pj).
For ease of exposition, if si is assigned to a project pj offered by lecturer lk, we
may also say that si is assigned to lk, and lk is assigned si. Thus we denote the
set of students assigned to lk in M as M(lk).
4A project pj ∈ P is full, undersubscribed or oversubscribed in M if |M(pj)|
is equal to, less than or greater than cj , respectively. The corresponding terms
apply to each lecturer lk with respect to dk. We say that a project pj ∈ P is
non-empty if |M(pj)| > 0.
A matching M is an assignment such that |M(si)| ≤ 1 for each si ∈ S,
|M(pj)| ≤ cj for each pj ∈ P , and |M(lk)| ≤ dk for each lk ∈ L (that is,
each student is assigned to at most one project, and no project or lecturer is
oversubscribed). Given a matching M , an acceptable pair (si, pj) ∈ (S ×P) \M
is a blocking pair of M if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. either si is unassigned in M or si prefers pj to M(si), and pj is undersub-
scribed, and either
(a) si ∈M(lk) and lk prefers pj to M(si), or
(b) si /∈M(lk) and lk is undersubscribed, or
(c) si /∈M(lk) and lk prefers pj to his worst non-empty project,
where lk is the lecturer who offers pj .
If such a pair were to occur, it would undermine the integrity of the match-
ing as the student and lecturer involved would rather be assigned together than
remain in their current assignment. With respect to the SPA-P instance given in
Fig. 1, M1 = {(s1, p3), (s2, p1)} is clearly a matching. It is obvious that each of
students s1 and s2 is matched to her first ranked project in M1. Although s3 is
unassigned in M1, the lecturer offering p3 (the only project that s3 finds accept-
able) is assumed to be indifferent among those students who find p3 acceptable.
Also p3 is full in M1. Thus, we say that M1 admits no blocking pair.
Student preferences Lecturer preferences
s1: p3 p2 p1 l1: p2 p1
s2: p1 p2 l2: p3
s3: p3
Fig. 1. An instance I1 of SPA-P. Each project has capacity 1, whilst each of lecturer l1
and l2 has capacity 2 and 1 respectively.
Another way in which a matching could be undermined is through a group
of students acting together. Given a matching M , a coalition is a set of students
{si0 , . . . , sir−1}, for some r ≥ 2 such that each student sij (0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1)
is assigned in M and prefers M(sij+1) to M(sij ), where addition is performed
modulo r. With respect to Fig. 1, the matching M2 = {(s1, p1), (s2, p2), (s3, p3)}
admits a coalition {s1, s2}, as students s1 and s2 would rather permute their
assigned projects in M2 so as to be better off. We note that the number of
students assigned to each project and lecturer involved in any such swap remains
the same after such a permutation. Moreover, the lecturers involved would have
no incentive to prevent the switch from occurring since they are assumed to be
indifferent between the students assigned to the projects they are offering. If a
matching admits no coalition, we define such matching to be coalition-free.
5Given an instance I of SPA-P, we define a matching M in I to be stable if
M admits no blocking pair and is coalition-free. It turns out that with respect
to this definition, stable matchings in I can have different sizes. Clearly, each
of the matchings M1 = {(s1, p3), (s2, p1)} and M3 = {(s1, p2), (s2, p1), (s3, p3)}
is stable in the SPA-P instance I1 shown in Fig. 1. The varying sizes of the
stable matchings produced naturally leads to the problem of finding a maximum
cardinality stable matching given an instance of SPA-P, which we denote by MAX-
SPA-P. In the next section, we describe our IP model to enable MAX-SPA-P to be
solved optimally.
3 An IP model for MAX-SPA-P
Let I be an instance of SPA-P involving a set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn1} of students, a
set P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn2} of projects and a set L = {l1, l2, . . . , ln3} of lecturers.
We construct an IP model J of I as follows. Firstly, we create binary variables
xi,j ∈ {0, 1} (1 ≤ i ≤ n1, 1 ≤ j ≤ n2) for each acceptable pair (si, pj) ∈
S × P such that xi,j indicates whether si is assigned to pj in a solution or not.
Henceforth, we denote by S a solution in the IP model J, and we denote by M
the matching derived from S. If xi,j = 1 under S then intuitively si is assigned
to pj in M , otherwise si is not assigned to pj in M . In what follows, we give the
constraints to ensure that the assignment obtained from a feasible solution in J
is a matching.
Matching Constraints. The feasibility of a matching can be ensured with the
following three sets of constraints.
∑
pj∈Ai
xi,j ≤ 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n1), (1)
n1∑
i=1
xi,j ≤ cj (1 ≤ j ≤ n2), (2)
n1∑
i=1
∑
pj∈Pk
xi,j ≤ dk (1 ≤ k ≤ n3) . (3)
Note that (1) implies that each student si ∈ S is not assigned to more than one
project, while (2) and (3) implies that the capacity of each project pj ∈ P and
each lecturer lk ∈ L is not exceeded.
We define rank(si, pj), the rank of pj on si’s preference list, to be r+1 where
r is the number of projects that si prefers to pj . An analogous definition holds for
rank(lk, pj), the rank of pj on lk’s preference list. With respect to an acceptable
pair (si, pj), we define Si,j = {pj′ ∈ Ai : rank(si, pj′) ≤ rank(si, pj)}, the set of
projects that si likes as much as pj . For a project pj offered by lecturer lk ∈ L,
we also define Tk,j = {pq ∈ Pk : rank(lk, pj) < rank(lk, pq)}, the set of projects
that are worse than pj on lk’s preference list.
6In what follows, we fix an arbitrary acceptable pair (si, pj) and we impose
constraints to ensure that (si, pj) is not a blocking pair of the matchingM (that
is, (si, pj) is not a type 1(a), type 1(b) or type 1(c) blocking pair of M). Firstly,
let lk be the lecturer who offers pj .
Blocking Pair Constraints. We define θi,j = 1 −
∑
pj′∈Si,j
xi,j′ . Intuitively,
θi,j = 1 if and only if si is unassigned in M or prefers pj to M(si). Next we
create a binary variable αj in J such that αj = 1 corresponds to the case when
pj is undersubscribed in M . We enforce this condition by imposing the following
constraint.
cjαj ≥ cj −
n1∑
i′=1
xi′,j , (4)
where
∑n1
i′=1 xi′,j = |M(pj)|. If pj is undersubscribed in M then the RHS of (4)
is at least 1, and this implies that αj = 1. Otherwise, αj is not constrained. Now
let γi,j,k =
∑
pj′∈Tk,j
xi,j′ . Intuitively, if γi,j,k = 1 in S then si is assigned to a
project pj′ offered by lk inM , where lk prefers pj to pj′ . The following constraint
ensures that (si, pj) does not form a type 1(a) blocking pair of M .
θi,j + αj + γi,j,k ≤ 2 . (5)
Note that if the sum of the binary variables in the LHS of (5) is less than or
equal to 2, this implies that at least one of the variables, say γi,j,k, is 0. Thus
the pair (si, pj) is not a type 1(a) blocking pair of M .
Next we define βi,k =
∑
pj′∈Pk
xi,j′ . Clearly, si is assigned to a project offered
by lk in M if and only if βi,k = 1 in S. Now we create a binary variable δk in J
such that δk = 1 in S corresponds to the case when lk is undersubscribed in M .
We enforce this condition by imposing the following constraint.
dkδk ≥ dk −
n1∑
i′=1
∑
pj′∈Pk
xi′,j′ , (6)
where
∑n1
i′=1
∑
pj′∈Pk
xi′,j′ = |M(lk)|. If lk is undersubscribed in M then the
RHS of (6) is at least 1, and this implies that δk = 1. Otherwise, δk is not
constrained. The following constraint ensures that (si, pj) does not form a type
1(b) blocking pair of M .
θi,j + αj + (1− βi,k) + δk ≤ 3 . (7)
We define Dk,j = {pj′ ∈ Pk : rank(lk, pj′) ≤ rank(lk, pj)}, the set of projects
that lk likes as much as pj. Next, we create a binary variable ηj,k in J such that
ηj,k = 1 if lk is full and prefers pj to his worst non-empty project in S. We
enforce this by imposing the following constraint.
dkηj,k ≥ dk −
n1∑
i′=1
∑
pj′∈Dk,j
xi′,j′ . (8)
7Finally, to avoid a type 1(c) blocking pair, we impose the following constraint.
θi,j + αj + (1− βi,k) + ηj,k ≤ 3 . (9)
Next, we give the constraints to ensure that the matching obtained from a
feasible solution in J is coalition-free.
Coalition Constraints. First, we introduce some additional notation. Given
an instance I′ of SPA-P and a matching M ′ in I′, we define the envy graph
G(M ′) = (S, A), where the vertex set S is the set of students in I′, and the arc
set A = {(si, si′) : si prefers M
′(si′) to M
′(si)}. It is clear that the matching
M2 = {(s1, p1), (s2, p2), (s3, p3)} admits a coalition {s1, s2} with respect to the
instance given in Fig. 1. The resulting envy graph G(M2) is illustrated below.
s1 s2s3
Fig. 2. The envy graph G(M2) corresponding to the SPA-P instance in Fig. 1.
Clearly, G(M ′) contains a directed cycle if and only if M ′ admits a coalition.
Moreover, G(M ′) is acyclic if and only if it admits a topological ordering. Now
to ensure that the matching M obtained from a feasible solution S under J is
coalition-free, we will enforce J to encode the envy graph G(M) and impose the
condition that it must admit a topological ordering. In what follows, we build
on our IP model J of I.
We create a binary variable ei,i′ for each (si, si′) ∈ S ×S, si 6= si′ , such that
the ei,i′ variables will correspond to the adjacency matrix of G(M). For each i
and i′ (1 ≤ i ≤ n1, 1 ≤ i
′ ≤ n1, i 6= i
′) and for each j and j′ (1 ≤ j ≤ n2, 1 ≤
j′ ≤ n2) such that si prefers pj′ to pj , we impose the following constraint.
ei,i′ + 1 ≥ xi,j + xi′,j′ . (10)
If (si, pj) ∈M and (si′ , pj′) ∈M and si prefers pj′ to pj, then ei,i′ = 1 and we
say si envies si′ . Otherwise, ei,i′ is not constrained. Next we enforce the condition
that G(M) must have a topological ordering. To hold the label of each vertex
in a topological ordering, we create an integer-valued variable vi corresponding
to each student si ∈ S (and intuitively to each vertex in G(M)). We wish to
enforce the constraint that if ei,i′ = 1 (that is, (si, si′) ∈ A), then vi < vi′ (that
is, the label of vertex si is smaller than the label of vertex si′). This is achieved by
imposing the following constraint for all i and i′ (1 ≤ i ≤ n1, 1 ≤ i
′ ≤ n1, i 6= i
′).
vi < vi′ + n1(1− ei,i′) . (11)
Note that the LHS of (11) is strictly less than the RHS of (11) if and only if
G(M) does not admit a directed cycle, and this implies that M is coalition-free.
8Variables. We define a collective notation for each variable involved in J as
follows.
X = {xi,j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n1, 1 ≤ j ≤ n2}, Λ = {αj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n2},
H = {ηj,k : 1 ≤ j ≤ n2, 1 ≤ k ≤ n3}, ∆ = {δk : 1 ≤ k ≤ n3},
E = {ei,i′ : 1 ≤ i ≤ n1, 1 ≤ i
′ ≤ n1}, V = {vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n1} .
Objective Function. The objective function given below is a summation of all
the xi,j binary variables. It seeks to maximize the number of students assigned
(that is, the cardinality of the matching).
max
n1∑
i=1
∑
pj∈Ai
xi,j . (12)
Finally, we have constructed an IP model J of I comprising the set of integer-
valued variables X,Λ,H,∆,E and V , the set of constraints (1) - (11) and an
objective function (12). Note that J can then be used to solve MAX-SPA-P opti-
mally. Given an instance I of SPA-P formulated as an IP model J using the above
transformation, we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. A feasible solution S to J corresponds to a stable matching M in I,
where obj(S) = |M |.
Proof. Assume firstly that J has a feasible solution S. LetM = {(si, pj) ∈ S×P :
xi,j = 1} be the assignment in I generated from S. Clearly obj(S) = |M |. We
note that (1) ensures that each student is assigned in M to at most one project.
Moreover, (2) and (3) ensures that the capacity of each project and lecturer is not
exceeded in M . Thus M , is a matching. We will prove that (4) - (9) guarantees
that M admits no blocking pair.
Suppose for a contradiction that there exists some acceptable pair (si, pj) that
forms a blocking pair of M , where lk is the lecturer who offers pj . This implies
that si is either unassigned in M or prefers pj to M(si). In either of these cases,∑
pj′∈Si,j
xi,j′ = 0, and thus θi,j = 1. Moreover, as (si, pj) is a blocking pair of
M , pj has to be undersubscribed in M , and thus
∑n1
i′=1 xi′,j < cj . This implies
that the RHS of (4) is strictly greater than 0, and since S is a feasible solution
to J, αj = 1.
Now suppose (si, pj) is a type 1(a) blocking pair of M . This implies M(si) =
pj′′ for some pj′′ ∈ Pk, where lk prefers pj tp pj′′ . Thus γi,j,k =
∑
pj′∈Tk,j
xi,j′ =
1, which implies that the LHS of (5) is strictly greater than 2. Thus S is infeasible,
a contradiction.
Next suppose (si, pj) is a type 1(b) blocking pair of M . This implies si /∈
M(lk) and thus 1−βi,k = 1−
∑
p′
j
∈Pk
xi,j′ = 1. Also, lk has to be undersubscribed
in M which implies that the RHS of (6) is strictly greater than 0, and thus
δk = 1. Hence the LHS of (7) is strictly greater than 3, a contradiction, since S
is a feasible solution.
9Next suppose (si, pj) is a type 1(c) blocking pair of M . This implies that
si /∈M(lk) and thus βi,k = 0. Also lk is full in M and prefers pj to pz, where pz
is lk’s worst non-empty project inM . This implies that the RHS of (8) is strictly
greater than 0, and thus ηj,k = 1. Hence the LHS of (9) is strictly greater than
3, and thus S is infeasible, a contradiction.
Finally, we show that (10) and (11) ensure that M is coalition-free. Suppose
for a contradiction that M admits a coalition {si0 , . . . , sir−1}, for some r ≥ 2.
This implies that for each t (0 ≤ t ≤ r−1), sit prefersM(sit+1) toM(sit), where
addition is taken modulo r, and hence eit,it+1 = 1, by (10). It follows from (11)
that vi0 < vi1 < · · · < vir−2 < vir−1 < vir = vi0 , a contradiction. Hence M is
coalition-free, and thus M is a stable matching.
Lemma 2. A stable matching M in I corresponds to a feasible solution S to J,
where |M | = obj(S).
Proof. Let M be a stable matching in I. First we set all the binary variables
involved in J to 0. For all (si, pj) ∈ M , we set xi,j = 1. Now, since M is a
matching, it is clear that (1) - (3) is satisfied. For any acceptable pair (si, pj) ∈
(S × P) \ M such that si is unassigned in M or prefers pj to M(si), we set
θi,j = 1. For any project pj ∈ P that is undersubscribed in M , we set αj = 1
and thus (4) is satisfied. For (5) not to be satisfied, its LHS must be strictly
greater than 2. This would only happen if there exists (si, pj) ∈ (S × P) \M ,
where lk is the lecturer who offers pj, such that θi,j = 1, αj = 1 and γi,j,k = 1.
This implies that either si is assigned in M to a project pj′ offered by lk such
that si prefers pj to pj′ , pj is undersubscribed in M , and lk prefers pj to pj′ .
Thus (si, pj) is a type 1(a) blocking pair of M , a contradiction to the stability
of M . Hence (5) is satisfied.
Now for any lecturer lk ∈ L that is undersubscribed in M , we set δk = 1.
Thus (6) is satisfied. Suppose (7) is not satisfied. This would only happen if there
exists (si, pj) ∈ (S × P) \M , where lk is the lecturer who offers pj , such that
θi,j = 1, αj = 1, βi,k = 0 and δk = 1. This implies that either si is unassigned in
M or prefers pj to M(si), si /∈M(lk), and each of pj and lk is undersubscribed.
Thus (si, pj) is a type 1(b) blocking pair of M , a contradiction to the stability
of M . Hence (7) is satisfied.
Suppose lk is a lecturer in L and pj is any project on lk’s preference list.
Let pz be lk’s worst non-empty project in M . If lk is full in M and prefers pj
to pz, we set ηj,k = 1. Then (8) is satisfied. Now suppose (9) is not satisfied.
This would only happen if there exists (si, pj) ∈ (S × P) \M , where lk is the
lecturer who offers pj , such that θi,j = 1, αj = 1, βi,k = 0 and ηj,k = 1. This
implies that either si is unassigned in M or prefers pj to M(si), si /∈M(lk), pj
is undersubscribed and lk prefers pj to his worst non-empty project in M . Thus
(si, pj) is a type 1(c) blocking pair of M , a contradiction to the stability of M .
Hence (9) is satisfied.
We denote byG(M) = (S, A) the envy graph ofM . Suppose si and si′ are any
two distinct students in S such that (si, pj) ∈ M , (si′ , pj′) ∈ M and si prefers
pj′ to pj (that is, (si, si′) ∈ A), we set ei,i′ = 1. Thus (10) is satisfied. Since
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M is a stable matching, M is coalition-free. This implies that G(M) is acyclic
and has a topological ordering σ : S → {1, 2, . . . , n1}. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1),
let vi = σ(si). Now suppose (11) is not satisfied. This implies that there exist
vertices si and si′ in G(M) such that vi ≥ vi′+n1(1−ei,i′). This is only possible
if ei,i′ = 1 since 1 ≤ vi ≤ n1 and 1 ≤ vi′ ≤ n1. Hence vi ≥ vi′ , a contradiction
to the fact that σ is a topological ordering of G(M) (since (si, si′) ∈ A implies
vi < vi′). Hence S, comprising the above assignment of values to the variables in
X ∪Λ∪H ∪∆∪E ∪V , is a feasible solution to J; and clearly |M | = obj(S).
Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately give rise to the following theorem regarding
the correctness of J.
Theorem 1. A feasible solution to J is optimal if and only if the corresponding
stable matching in I is of maximum cardinality.
Proof. Let S be an optimal solution to J. Then by Lemma 1, S corresponds
to a stable matching M in I such that obj(S) = |M |. Suppose M is not of
maximum cardinality. Then there exists a stable matching M ′ in I such that
|M ′| > |M |. By Lemma 2, M ′ corresponds to a feasible solution S′ to J such
that obj(S′) = |M ′| > |M | = obj(S). This is a contradiction, since S is an
optimal solution to J. Hence M is a maximum stable matching in I. Similarly,
if M is a maximum stable matching in I then M corresponds to an optimal
solution S to J.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we present results from an empirical analysis that investigates
how the sizes of the stable matchings produced by the approximation algorithms
compares to the optimal solution obtained from our IP model, on SPA-P instances
that are both randomly-generated and derived from real datasets.
4.1 Experimental Setup
There are clearly several parameters that can be varied, such as the number of
students, projects and lecturers; the length of the students’ preference lists; as
well as the total capacities of the projects and lecturers. For each range of values
for the first two parameters, we generated a set of random SPA-P instances. In
each set, we record the average size of a stable matching obtained from running
the approximation algorithms and the IP model. Further, we consider the average
time taken for the IP model to find an optimal solution.
By design, the approximation algorithms were randomised with respect to the
sequence in which students apply to projects, and the choice of students to reject
when projects and/or lecturers become full. In the light of this, for each dataset,
we also run the approximation algorithms 100 times and record the size of the
largest stable matching obtained over these runs. Our experiments therefore
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involve five algorithms: the optimal IP-based algorithm, the two approximation
algorithms run once, and the two approximation algorithms run 100 times.
We performed our experiments on a machine with dual Intel Xeon CPU
E5-2640 processors with 64GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 14.04. Each of the ap-
proximation algorithms was implemented in Java1. For our IP model, we carried
out the implementation using the Gurobi optimisation solver in Java1. For cor-
rectness testing on these implementations, we designed a stability checker which
verifies that the matching returned by the approximation algorithms and the IP
model does not admit a blocking pair or a coalition.
4.2 Experimental Results
Randomly-generated Datasets. All the SPA-P instances we randomly gener-
ated involved n1 students (n1 is henceforth referred to as the size of the instance),
0.5n1 projects, 0.2n1 lecturers and 1.1n1 total project capacity which was ran-
domly distributed amongst the projects. The capacity for each lecturer lk was
chosen randomly to lie between the highest capacity of the projects offered by
lk and the sum of the capacities of the projects that lk offers. In the first exper-
iment, we present results obtained from comparing the performance of the IP
model, with and without the coalition constraints in place.
Experiment 0. We increased the number of students n1 while maintaining a
ratio of projects, lecturers, project capacities and lecturer capacities as described
above. For various values of n1 (100 ≤ n1 ≤ 1000) in increments of 100, we cre-
ated 100 randomly-generated instances. Each student’s preference list contained
a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 5 projects. With respect to each value of
n1, we obtained the average time taken for the IP solver to output a solution,
both with and without the coalition constraints being enforced. The results,
displayed in Table 1 show that when we removed the coalition constraints, the
average time for the IP solver to output a solution is significantly faster than
when we enforced the coalition constraints.
In the remaining experiments, we thus remove the constraints that enforce
the absence of a coalition in the solution. We are able to do this for the purposes
of these experiments because the largest size of a stable matching is equal to
the largest size of a matching that potentially admits a coalition but admits no
blocking pair2, and we were primarily concerned with measuring stable matching
cardinalities. However the absence of the coalition constraints should be borne
in mind when interpreting the IP solver runtime data in what follows.
In the next two experiments, we discuss results obtained from running the
five algorithms on randomly-generated datasets.
1 https://github.com/sofiat-olaosebikan/spa-p-isco-2018
2 This holds because the number of students assigned to each project and lecturer in
the matching remains the same even after the students involved in such coalition
permute their assigned projects.
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Experiment 1. As in the previous experiment, we maintained the ratio of the
number of students to projects, lecturers and total project capacity; as well as
the length of the students’ preference lists. For various values of n1 (100 ≤ n1 ≤
2500) in increments of 100, we created 1000 randomly-generated instances. With
respect to each value of n1, we obtained the average sizes of stable matchings
constructed by the five algorithms run over the 1000 instances. The result dis-
played in Fig. 3(a) (and also in Fig. 4(a)) shows the ratio of the average size of
the stable matching produced by the approximation algorithms with respect to
the maximum cardinality matching produced by the IP solver.
Figure 3(a) shows that each of the approximation algorithms produces sta-
ble matchings with a much higher cardinality from multiple runs, compared to
running them only once. Also, the average time taken for the IP solver to find
a maximum cardinality matching increases as the size of the instance increases,
with a running time of less than one second for instance size 100, increasing
roughly linearly to 13 seconds for instance size 2500 (see Fig. 3(b)).
Experiment 2. In this experiment, we varied the length of each student’s
preference list while maintaining a fixed number of students, projects, lecturers
and total project capacity. For various values of x (2 ≤ x ≤ 10), we generated
1000 instances, each involving 1000 students, with each student’s preference
list containing exactly x projects. The result for all values of x is displayed in
Fig. 4(a). Figure 4(a) shows that as we increase the preference list length, the
stable matchings produced by each of the approximation algorithms gets close
to having maximum cardinality. It also shows that with a preference list length
greater than 5, the 3
2
-approximation algorithm produces an optimal solution,
even on a single run. Moreover, the average time taken for the IP solver to find
a maximum matching increases as the length of the students’ preference lists
increases, with a running time of two seconds when each student’s preference
list is of length 2, increasing roughly linearly to 17 seconds when each student’s
preference list is of length 10 (see Fig. 4(b)).
Real Datasets. The real datasets in this paper are based on actual student
preference data and manufactured lecturer data from previous runs of student-
project allocation processes at the School of Computing Science, University of
Glasgow. Table 2 shows the properties of the real datasets, where n1, n2 and
n3 denotes the number of students, projects and lecturers respectively; and l
denotes the length of each student’s preference list. For all these datasets, each
project has a capacity of 1. In the next experiment, we discuss how the lecturer
preferences were generated. We also discuss the results obtained from running
the five algorithms on the corresponding SPA-P instances.
Experiment 3. We derived the lecturer preference data from the real datasets
as follows. For each lecturer lk, and for each project pj offered by lk, we obtained
the number aj of students that find pj acceptable. Next, we generated a strict
preference list for lk by arranging lk’s proposed projects in (i) a random manner,
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(ii) ascending order of aj , and (iii) descending order of aj, where (ii) and (iii) are
taken over all projects that lk offers. Table 2 shows the size of stable matchings
obtained from the five algorithms, where A,B,C,D and E denotes the solution
obtained from the IP model, 100 runs of 3
2
-approximation algorithm, single run
of 3
2
-approximation algorithm, 100 runs of 2-approximation algorithm, and single
run of 2-approximation algorithm respectively. The results are essentially consis-
tent with the findings in the previous experiments, that is, the 3
2
-approximation
algorithm produces stable matchings whose sizes are close to optimal.
Table 1. Results for Experiment 0. Average time (in seconds) for the IP solver to
output a solution, both with and without the coalition constraints being enforced.
Size of instance 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Av. time without coalition 0.12 0.27 0.46 0.69 0.89 1.17 1.50 1.86 2.20 2.61
Av. time with coalition 0.71 2.43 4.84 9.15 13.15 19.34 28.36 38.18 48.48 63.50
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Table 2. Properties of the real datasets and results for Experiment 3.
Random Most popular Least popular
Year n1 n2 n3 l A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
2014 55 149 38 6 55 55 55 54 53 55 55 55 54 50 55 55 55 54 52
2015 76 197 46 6 76 76 76 76 72 76 76 76 76 72 76 76 76 76 75
2016 92 214 44 6 84 82 83 77 75 85 85 83 79 76 82 80 77 76 74
2017 90 289 59 4 89 87 85 80 76 90 89 86 81 79 88 85 84 80 77
4.3 Discussions and Concluding Remarks
The results presented in this section suggest that even as we increase the number
of students, projects, lecturers, and the length of the students’ preference lists,
each of the approximation algorithms finds stable matchings that are close to
having maximum cardinality, outperforming their approximation factor. Perhaps
most interesting is the 3
2
-approximation algorithm, which finds stable matchings
that are very close in size to optimal, even on a single run. These results also
holds analogously for the instances derived from real datasets.
We remark that when we removed the coalition constraints, we were able to
run the IP model on an instance size of 10000, with the solver returning a maxi-
mum matching in an average time of 100 seconds, over 100 randomly-generated
instances. This shows that the IP model (without enforcing the coalition con-
straints), can be run on SPA-P instances that appear in practice, to find maxi-
mum cardinality matchings that admit no blocking pair. Coalitions should then
be eliminated in polynomial time by repeatedly constructing an envy graph, sim-
ilar to the one described in [11, p.290], finding a directed cycle and letting the
students in the cycle swap projects.
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